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SCHOPENHAUER AND VON HARTMANN.

BY WM. R. MORSE.

Though like all other true philosophers each of these more modern thinkers has a system entirely *sui generis*, yet a common bond exists between them in many respects, and allows of a comparison which points out the peculiarities of each. Again, both are so modern as to be our contemporaries, and this fact is prejudicial to a true estimate of their excellencies and defects. A philosophy is essentially a mental growth. Two such organic wholes as the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, may be likened to two large and beautiful trees, the result of many years growth. Of the beauties and general effects of these trees, as well as of their comparative excellence but little can be known while one stands beneath them. As soon, however, as one goes a short distance into the surrounding plain and looks back upon them, they stand forth in a grandeur proportionate to the littleness about them and may be admired and correctly compared at leisure. It is so with these two systems : Despite the facts that Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* has been rapidly gaining in reputation for ten years and that Von Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten* has reached its sixth edition, while the author is yet in his prime, I venture to assert that it is impossible to fix to-day their true position in the history of the development of the human mind.

Indeed, a very significant fact in regard to Schopenhauer's greatness is, I think, that he should now be recognized, *although forty years (1819-59) elapsed between the publication of the first and third editions* of his marvellous work. Surely the farther one presses into the level "nunc stans" of time, the greater the grandeur of the lofty past. Thus premising, let us compare the two philosophers as best we may, looking first for their similarities.

As Schopenhauer mainly follows Kant, so Von Hartmann, but not professedly, follows Schopenhauer; yet as one begins to read Von Hartmann after having read Schopenhauer, the change, not only of style, but also of method, is so abrupt that considerable progress is requisite before this discipleship is clearly seen. The reason of these changes will be mentioned later. In common with Kant both Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann are agreed upon the phenomenality of this world, yet all three differ in their modes of arriving at that conclusion. Thus, while Kant makes

the world phenomenal by calling space and time unreal (subjective), Schopenhauer (*Die Welt*,* etc., I., 11) treats the world as a mere picture of the mind (*Vorstellung*), and Von Hartmann, after proving the reality of the world (B. VIII.), declares that "reality is only phenomenality :" (C. XI.) all these three arriving at identically the same conclusion. Again do Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann follow Kant in that they are essentially *transcendental philosophers*, but here they also differ from him in that while he announces the impossibility of any science of the absolute (intelligible), they devote all their energies to that very end. Both Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann prove the essential oneness of all things spiritual and material (*Alleinheit*—ultra-pantheism) and to this end they strive to identify mind and matter. This Schopenhauer does by a very presumptuous argument, wherein by application of his grand idealistic principle, *esse=pervici*, he identifies matter with its subjective correlative, causality. He beautifully phrases it "the visibility of space and time." (I, 1, 4.) Von Hartmann, on the other hand, by an ingenious argument of marvellous nicety (C. V.) resolves matter in force (will) and material (stoff, that on which force acts), and proves the latter conception to be an absurdity. In thus doing away with matter as such, both philosophers are taxed to their utmost in point of argument, and both nobly prove themselves equal to the occasion. As a natural result of their belief in the phenomenality of this world, both, a third time, agree with Kant in a strict necessitarianism as far as the world about us is concerned and a libertism as to their respective first principles, and even go as far in the direction of belief in a human free-will as to accept Kant's theory of intelligible and empirical character. This latter doctrine in both Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann appears as an exposition of the supremacy of the will, and unconscious, respectively, in character (*Die Welt*, &c., 2 cap. 19, *Phil. d. Unb.* B. IV.) His necessitarianism Schopenhauer at once boldly asserts by declaring causality as widely valid a law of being as time and space (I, 1, 2), and frequently referring to the beautiful demonstration of this in his graduation thesis, a prize essay, which is virtually the foundation of his whole philosophy. It is styled the "Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Satz vom Grunde*), and shows the subjection of everything in the universe of mind and matter to the stern law of necessity, as expressed by the four "roots" or forms (Ges-

*As all the references are to Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.*, 4th ed., or to Von Hartmann's *Phil. d. Unbewussten*, 6th ed., only the numbers of the chapters, &c., will hereafter be given.

talten) of this principle. Von Hartmann, however, denies the possibility of free conscious will, by simply saying that consciousness itself is a matter of accident, a phenomenon and hence a link in the chain of cause and effect. Both he and Schopenhauer make consciousness an accident of volition, thus implying the distinction between intellect and consciousness, so clearly brought out by Von Hartmann. Though both philosophies are pessimistic, none was perhaps so thoroughly discouraging and morbid a view as that of Schopenhauer. Of this, however, anon. Finally, these two men have succeeded in rearing structures of thought whose beauties, in each case, are greatly enhanced by their consistency. Here, too, perhaps, Schopenhauer leads (though Von Hartmann is not far behind); for a more perfect and organic whole than his great work is rarely found.

With this short notice of the similarities* of the two philosophers, we come to remark their differences, premising, however, as a first and peculiar difference (which must have been already noticed), that, although the same conclusions are in many cases arrived at by each, they are arrived at by totally different roads.

The first, though perhaps not the greatest, of all the striking differences, will be noticed immediately a chapter has been read. I refer to the total difference of method and style. This difference can be clearly explained. It results simply from the fact that the works are but mirrors of their respective authors. There never existed two more fundamentally different men in character, education and circumstances, than Arthur Schopenhauer and Edouard Von Hartmann. Schopenhauer was of a peevish, crabbed and cowardly disposition, an utter misanthrope, without family and at variance with his only living relative. He thoroughly believed in and practiced his pessimism. His character was the black background on which his splendid genius shone all the more brilliantly. This is clearly seen in many passages, where for gloomy eloquence and bitter sarcasm he outdoes himself. Witness the crabbed satisfaction he takes in drawing his gloomy picture of the misery of the world to prove his pessimism *a posteriori* (I., 4, 59). In education, however, he was a marvel. He spoke German, French, Italian and English, and was well read in these four literatures. He studied under Fichte, which fact, together with his graduation thesis mentioned above, sufficiently shows his education to have been of the very broadest and best.

*It will be seen that all the more important agreements with each other, are also agreements with Kant.

He was a special lover of the Buddhist writings. Indeed, he may be said to have been a Buddhist, if anything; for he takes upon himself, in his work, to explain much of the mythic teachings of religion. It is probably from this breadth of culture that he breaks over the bounds of the average German writer, casts free from the inclosed sentences so characteristic of German philosophy, and succeeds in incorporating into one and the same work a most ingenious philosophy and a most brilliant literary effort. The many gems of literary composition scattered through his book cannot fail to hold the rapt attention even of his most hearty adversary. The value of his work as a literary product is also vastly enhanced by the lively play of imagination and the happy use of figure constantly found as illustration. Schopenhauer's illustrations are simply admirable. Most of his points are understood all the better on account of his clear and apt illustrations, and all are rendered immeasurably more vivid. Perhaps the best figure in the whole work is the simile between time and a continuously revolving disc (I., 4, 54), of which the ever-ascending half of the circumference represents the future, and the ever-descending half the past, while the constant point between the two, *i. e.*, the uppermost point on the circumference, exactly images the unchanging yet never-dying present, the eternal "*nunc stans*." The figure is exquisite. (It may be of interest, and is certainly a proof of Schopenhauer's fear of death—despite his professions to the contrary—to know that this chapter (I., 4, 54) was written to defend his flight from the cholera at Berlin. It is a most ingenious argument. On the whole, then, we see Schopenhauer's style, literary excellence and happy use of figures to be a direct outgrowth of his character and broad education. The same holds true of Von Hartmann, but far different are the results. While Schopenhauer had a literary education, Von Hartmann's was military. In fact it is only, as it were, by accident, that the latter became known to the world as a philosophic writer. Wounded in the leg shortly before the battle of Sadowa, he became a cripple for life, and having a liking for metaphysics he then began to read and write on that subject, and has since shown himself to be a thinker of the very first order. As might be expected, the intricate mathematical calculation and severe physical training requisite for his admission to the army, failed to develop in the soldier-thinker any marked vividness of imagination. In fact but three or four figurative illustrations are resort to throughout his whole work. It is characterized by an

exactness of statement and a clearness which betokens a vast range of scientific research and a wonderful power of argument. In fine, judging from their works alone, Schopenhauer was the broad and accomplished scholar and man of the world while Von Hartmann was rather the accurate and conscientious closet student. While Schopenhauer was alone in the world, uncomfortable and peevish in disposition, Von Hartmann, on the other hand, was the fond husband of an accomplished lady and the happy father of several children. In fact he says in his autobiography that he is a pessimist only in theory. The effects of this are apparent in his work in contrast with the bitter taunts of Schopenhauer against everybody but himself: With Schopenhauer a fact was not only a fact, but a subject of some sarcastic or disparaging remark; with Von Hartmann a fact is a fact; if it favors his theory, well and good; if not, he lets it alone, or at least refrains from the course taken by Schopenhauer. Another probable result of the difference of education is seen in the method of procedure in the arguments of each. While Schopenhauer's work is entirely deductive, his first words, "Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung," being, in fact, the sum of his whole philosophy, Von Hartmann takes a course midway between this and the opposite method. His first steps are inductive, then a jump to a general principle, then a deductive retrograde. This curious method he condemns as premature in Schelling, but considers it to be used by himself in the "fullness of time." He considers it virtually the method of "inductive physical science," and so adopts as his motto "Speculative Resultate nach inductiv-naturwissenschaftlicher Methode." His discussion of the deductive and inductive methods is admirable. Just here a characteristic difference may be noted in that while Schopenhauer has but short and irregular prefaces to his work and even in one of these (preface to 2nd ed., *ad. fin.*) cannot omit his characteristic disparagement of "Philosophieprofessore," Von Hartmann devotes the first thirty-six pages of his work to an introduction stating the design of the work and its method, and giving a fine criticism of his predecessors with reference to his new departure, "unconscious mental picture" (*unbewusste Vorstellung*), also, strange to say, containing a most concise and clear argument for the notion of "final cause in nature," a remarkable thing for an atheist and realist, and a thing ridiculed by Schopenhauer. Let this suffice of the writers themselves and their habits as authors; but lest too much may seem

to have been devoted to this, I will say that one may very easily be convinced of the contrary by a perusal of even the first twenty pages of each author. We come now to the difference of the systems themselves. These are comparatively few, but very marked.

One of the greatest, if not the fundamental one, of these differences, is the idea which gives to Von Hartmann's work its name and character. While Schopenhauer believes that the will is the absolute and only being *per se*, the *solus ipse*, entirely primary and prior to intellect, Von Hartmann as confidently asserts that wherever will is found, there, also, is intellect; that, as he says, "will and intellect (*Vorstellung*) are never separate" (A, IV.); that the fact that we are not conscious of an act of will by no means proves that nobody or nothing else is, or that it is not self-conscious. He distinctly says that wherever there is a will there is inevitably implied a consciousness or knowledge, or, more accurately, mental picture (*Vorstellung*) of what is willed. Else how is the thing to be willed or done? This is the kernel of his argument. This makes him one degree more explicit than Schopenhauer, who simply says that will is everything; Von Hartmann says, on the other hand, that the Unconscious is everything, and by what is explained above, we are at liberty to consider this to be unconscious will conjoined to unconscious mental picture (*Vorstellung*)—a dualistic position in spite of his claims to the opposite, and another difference from Schopenhauer, who is constantly monistic. If either of these two philosophers were to call their absolute "God," their system would in respect to its attributes come remarkably near to Christianity. In fact, Von Hartmann saw this so plainly as to make it worthy of notice in his sixth edition, where he devotes a whole section (C, VIII.) to the refutation of this idea. Thus we see that to Von Hartmann belongs, perhaps, the clearest and best known demonstration of the idea of unconscious mental activity, in other words, of the fact that "intellect" and "consciousness" are not convertible terms.

A second and most remarkable difference is that of the point of the reality of the world about us. Transcendentally both authors are realists, *i. e.*, each believes that his first great principle actually and really exists *per se*, though not cognizable as such by us. Empirically they differ, and most widely; Schopenhauer emphatically and repeatedly asserts that this world is simply a

subjective perception (*Vorstellung*), a phenomenon depending entirely on the subject. This world to him is simply what he perceives it to be, and because he so perceives it but *per se*, absolutely nothing. Here he is a consistent idealist. Von Hartmann, however, most stoutly maintains the opposite. In fact, there is no more concise and powerful statement of the arguments for realism than are found in his chapter on sensuous perception (B. IX.). But, strangely enough, later in his work, as noticed above, he most ingeniously argues for the fact that "reality is only phenomenality," thus reconciling what would otherwise be a glaring inconsistency. This reconciliation also serves to do away with several apparently inconsistent positions of materialist, sensualist and idealist, which he seems to occupy earlier in the work.

Again, Von Hartmann takes a somewhat new departure in that he entirely ignores the emotions as such by resolving them into will and unconscious mental activity (*Vorstellung*). He makes the essence of the passions and emotions (*Gefuehl*) to be the fact that the will and mental activities (*Vorstellungen*) concerned are unconscious to the subject of these feelings. This is entirely different from Schopenhauer, who accepts the three-fold division of the human mind. It may be well here also to mention that Schopenhauer makes a very peculiar use of the word ("Verstand") understanding. "Its sole function," he says, "is to cognize causality;" while all higher powers are by him comprehended under the concept "Vernunft" (reason). Most German writers, including Kant and Von Hartmann, use "Vernunft" to denote the very highest faculty of abstract reason, and comprise the remaining faculties under "Verstand." A peculiar feature of Von Hartmann, too, is his chapter (B. I.) proving such feelings as the fear of death, sympathy, modesty, &c., to be cases of instinct in the human mind. Indeed, he acknowledges (A. VIII. *ad init.*) that "instinct," "reflex action," "natural impulse" and "impulse of the Unconscious," are with him interchangeable terms.

A characteristic difference of result in the speculations of the two philosophers is, that while Schopenhauer comes to the conclusion that "this is the worst possible world and inhabited by the worst possible beings," and that, it being misery to live, we should seek to die, or, as he puts it, "cease to will," Von Hartmann, on the other hand, proves that though the worst possible world this is also the best possible one, by the ingenious argument that it is the work of the Unconscious, which is omniscient and in-

failable. If the manner of arriving at these conclusions be examined in the case of each philosopher, this apparent inconsistency in Von Hartmann will be done away with. The grand point of difference in the pessimism of these men lies in this : Schopenhauer declares that life is simply a continuously renewed volition and, having previously asserted the effect of such volition to be misery at the non-attainment of the object, thus makes *life* essentially painful and wretched ; Von Hartmann, on the other hand, refers specifically, not to life (*willing*), but to cognition (becoming conscious—*Bewusst-werden*—*knowing*.) He says (C. III.) that consciousness is the result of two opposite volitions (a thing which must necessarily produce pain) ; that consciousness is thus an implied pain, thus making knowing the source of our misery, while Schopenhauer would make conscious volition the cause. This allows Von Hartmann to bring in with perfect consistency the supreme wisdom and infallibility of his “Unconscious” to argue for the “Best-möglichkeit der Welt,” and at the same time prevents Schopenhauer from doing the same thing. Thus this admission of Von Hartmann as to optimism is a cheerful element, entirely wanting in the gloomy grandeur of Schopenhauer’s thought, and to a mind accustomed to view this world as an evidence of God’s goodness, it can but ennable the memory of the atheist, Von Hartmann, who has succeeded thus grandly in what so many so-called Christian professors often utterly fail.

A final difference of these thinkers presents itself. Schopenhauer’s theory inevitably leads to quietism. By making life misery he condemns all activity, even the effort of the suicide, and commends an utter cessation of volition or, as he says, “loss of individuality.” For him the only happiness—a negative one—is to be found in cessation, *i. e.*, of life, in short, in a death consisting of a loss of individuality (I. 4, 54). Von Hartmann takes an exactly opposite course, accuses quietism of producing the very effects it seeks to prevent (C, XIV.), and announces the practical rule of action to be to devote oneself to furthering the progress of the world (*ibid.*), which is to be done by acting with a view to the greatest attainable total of happiness. Thus Von Hartmann advocates a quietism which is at the same time an activism. For the whole object of the world process according to him is to quiet the universal will and this is to be attained by the action of individual wills, certainly a most encouraging view.

If the reader has had patience with us thus far, he will have

seen that while Schopenhauer's work is grand, even sublime, it is gloomy and discouraging, but Von Hartmann has constructed a work not only beautiful and symmetrical but adapted to the world of to-day and above all encouraging, ennobling and almost Christian. In fact, I can but think it an apt simile to compare these two works of speculative art to two master pieces of ecclesiastical architecture. The one is the ancient cathedral of many years growth, rich in its luxurious variety and pervaded with its perfect harmony of myriad parts, but with all its grandeur gloomy, forbidding, awful. The other is the modern sanctuary, beautiful in its regularity and grand in its simplicity but with these qualities enhanced a thousand-fold by the fact that it is also encouraging, elevating, ennobling.

UPON THE SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL FUNCTIONS OF UNIVERSITIES.

Translated from the German of F. W. J. von Schelling by ELLA S. MORGAN.

[Second Lecture *Ueber die Methode des Akademischen Studiums.*]

The idea of a university course of study, led us to consider the higher idea of an existing totality of sciences, which we sought to comprehend in its supreme idea, in archetypal knowing; on the other hand, it leads us to the particular conditions under which the sciences are taught and disseminated in our universities.

To the philosopher it might indeed seem more dignified to make an independent sketch of the totality of science, and to prescribe the methods of its first acquisition, without reference to the forms of merely existing arrangements. But I believe that I shall be able to prove in the following lecture that it is just these forms that were necessary in the spirit of the modern world, and will continue to be at least external conditions of the interpenetration of the different elements of its civilization, until the turbulent mixture is thereby purified into finer organizations.